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MARYLAND INHERITANCE TAXATION OF
TESTAMENTARY OPTIONS
TO PURCHASE
William M. Simmonst
This Article examines a Kent County, Maryland Circuit
Court opinion, the rationale of which leads to a result
arguably at odds with the purpose of Maryland inheritance
tax law. The author, after a review of relevant extrajurisdictional case law, offers suggestions for judicial and
legislative remedial action.
I.

INTRODUCTION

On August 8, 1961, the Honorable George B. Rasin, Jr., then an
Associate Judge of the Second Judicial Circuit for Kent County,
Maryland, filed a memorandum opinion in the case of Clark v.
Miller,' which held that a person who receives by will an option to
purchase property for a specific sum that is less than the property's
fair market value is not liable for the inheritance tax on the
difference between the option price and the fair market value.
Such a holding should come as a shock to anyone familiar with
our modem scheme of inheritance taxation. The Supreme Court of2
Washington succinctly stated the problem in In re Cowles' Estate.
There the decedent's son, who received by his father's will an option
to purchase stock at a fixed price, contended that the option price
was binding on the court when valuing the property for inheritance
tax purposes. The court pointed out that to permit this type of
scheme would be to frustrate the purpose of the inheritance tax
effectively determine the amount
statutes because a decedent could
3
of inheritance tax to be paid.
Because the rationale of Clark v. Miller arguably frustrates the
inheritance tax statute in Maryland, this article will carefully
examine Judge Rasin's reasoning. Furthermore, as this case is the
only decisional law authority on point in Maryland, 4 this article will

t B.A., 1975, magna cum laude, Ohio Wesleyan University; J.D., 1978, University
of Maryland; Assistant Reporter to the Court of Appeals Standing Committee on
Rules of Practice and Procedure; Member of the Maryland State Bar Association.

1. Daily Record, December 13, 1961 at 3 (Kent Co. Cir. Ct., Equity No. 4517, filed
Aug. 8, 1961).

2. 36 Wash. 2d 710, 219 P.2d 964 (1950).
3. Id. at 717, 219 P.2d at 967-68.
4. Although an unreported opinion of a circuit court is not true case law authority
in the sense that it would bind other courts by the rule of stare decisis, it is
authority of sorts. On the basis of this decision, the Maryland Comptroller of the
Treasury authorized a refund of the disputed tax, an amount totalling $1,125, in
the instant case. Moreover, the Register of Wills of Kent County believes he is
bound by this decision in similar cases. Conversation with Janet Ashley, Deputy
Register of Wills, Kent County, Maryland (October, 1978).
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review relevant out-of-state and federal case law in order to
determine the proper course for the Maryland General Assembly, or
the Maryland courts, to follow to avoid the undesirable result of
Clark v. Miller.
II.

CLARK v. MILLER

In Clark v. Miller the decedent's will granted an apparent option
to buy a farm to C. Edward Miller for $15,000, a price equal to
approximately one-half its value at the time of decedent's death. The
executor, Marion Clark, paid the collateral inheritance tax on the
appraised value of the farm ($30,000). After Miller decided to exercise
the option, Clark brought suit in equity for a decree that Miller was
liable to the estate for the inheritance tax due on $15,000, the
difference between the option price and the appraised value.
The chancellor held that no tax was due on the difference in
value and suggested that the executor should apply for a refund of
the excess tax paid. 5 In so holding, Judge Rasin reasoned that the
only issue was whether Miller was "a beneficiary or 'donative taker'
under the will" or whether he received an option to purchase. 6 Judge
Rasin decided that the will created an option to purchase. Such an
option, he reasoned, is taxable only at the option price because
executing the option made Miller a purchaser by deed, not a donative
taker under the will.7 Moreover, the judge stated that Miller did not
because the will did not
receive $15,000 by way of distribution
8
contain a provision to that effect.
An examination of the chancellor's opinion suggests that he
erred. Although he made a logical (and in the author's opinion,
correct) determination of what Miller received by virtue of the will an option to purchase - Judge Rasin failed to confront the problem
of valuing this apparent gift. 9 Certainly, if the option price equaled

5. The Executor applied for the refund and, on October 10, 1961, the Comptroller
authorized that the $1,125 previously paid be refunded. (Authorization No. 3166).
6. Daily Record, December 13, 1961 at 3, col. 1 (Kent Co. Cir. Ct., Equity No. 4517,
filed August 8, 1961).
7. Id.
8. Id. at 3, col. 2. The $15,000 represents the difference between the appraised value
($30,000) and the option price ($15,000).
9. Although the posture of this article makes clear the donative aspect of this
devise, it may be less clear to persons in rural counties, where non-resident land
owners often encounter difficulty in finding tenants to farm their land. When a
good tenant is located, most non-resident owners will make great efforts to keep
him because his work is highly valued. If a good relationship continues, the
landowner may very well create a testamentary option allowing the tenant to
purchase the land at a reduced price after the landowner's death. This is not so
much a gift as it is a recognition by the landowner of the fact that the tenant has
already invested a great deal in the land in continued service and human labor,
and the option is in the nature of deferred compensation, over and above his
share of crops, for the real value of the tenant's contribution in keeping the farm
operative.
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the fair market value of the property* no problem would exist. Where,
however, the option price is less than the value of the property, the
difference in value is tantamount to a gift to the optionee. If the
option price is determined in an arm's-length transaction, a court
would probably accept the price as the valuation regardless of the
apparent gift. Where, however, the price is not established by
bargaining, or it is ascertained in a non-arm's length transaction
(such as an intra-family sale), courts have traditionally looked
beyond the price established by the parties to search for concealed
gifts. Judge Rasin erred by failing to conduct this search.
Consequently, this article will examine both the manner in which
other courts have decided what passed under wills in similar
situations and the manner in which the courts valued these similar
testamentary dispositions.
III. WHAT PASSES AT DEATH BY VIRTUE OF THE WILL
In general, Judge Rasin was correct in his determination that
what passed under the will was an option to purchase. It has been
noted that, where it appears there has been a bequest of an option,
one of two things could have been created by the words of the will:
an option to purchase property or a devise subject to a charge. 10
The distinction between a devise subject to a charge and an
option to purchase was discussed by the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania in In re Ludwick's Estate." In that case the testator's
will contained a provision that gave his son the right to buy a farm
at its appraised value, but if he refused, then the testator's four
daughters, in order of seniority, were "to have the privilege of
taking."'1 2 The son was ill at the time of the appointment and died
five days later without having made either an election to take or not
to take the farm at its appraised value. In holding that the right to
elect did not pass to the son's heirs because the testamentary
provision granted an option to purchase that terminated at the son's
death, the court noted that if the will had devised the farm subject to
a charge of the appraised value, a fee simple would have been
acquired subject to the charge. 13 In this case, however, the court
stated that the son "had a right to refuse to take, and fee-simple title
could not vest until his decision on this point, and he never did
decide."' 4 Citing Chief Justice Marshall, the court reasoned that "[i]t
seems to be of the very nature of a right to elect one of two things,5
that actual ownership is not acquired in either, until it be elected."'
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Annot., 44 A.L.R.2d 1214 (1955).
269 Pa. 365, 112 A. 543 (1921).
Id. at 368, 112 A. at 543.
Id. at 369, 112 A. at 544.
Id.
Id. (quoting United States v. Grundy, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 337, 352 (1806)).
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The court also held that there was no presumption of election to
exercise the option merely because it would have been to the
advantage of the recipient to do 80.16
This case suggests that a devise subject to a charge is a gift
(devise) with a condition subsequent. Thus, once given, title vests
and is subject to divestment only upon occurrence of the condition non-payment of the charge on the property. Where there is an option
to purchase, however, there is no interest in the property, and title
does not vest until an election
to purchase is made in accordance
17
with the terms of the will.
This reasoning is further supported by the later Pennsylvania
case of In re Horn's Estate.18 In that case, the lower court decided
that the will created a fee simple estate upon a condition subsequent.
Consequently, the lower court held that title passed to the recipient
as of the decedent's death and that the recipient was entitled to all
rents, issues, and profits accruing thereafter. This reasoning was
affirmed on appeal. The appellate court stated that the codicil in
question in the case, which used the words "give and devise" and
"heirs and assigns," evidenced the determination that there was an
outright devise of the farm subject only to the conditions of payment
described later in the codicil. The court distinguished this case from
In re Ludwick's Estate because no outright devise was made in that
case. Title would have passed to the optionee only upon a clear
acceptance of the option and compliance with its conditions and this
was clearly unlike the situation resulting from Horn's devise upon a
condition subsequent.
Additional clarification of the term "option to purchase" is
found in the common definitions given to it by the courts. The best
example is the definition given by the Utah Supreme Court in
Chournos v. Evona Investment Co. 19 There the court stated that,
An option to purchase may be defined as a contract by
which an owner agrees with another person that he shall
have the privilege of buying his property at a fixed price
within a specified time. The landowner does not sell his
land; he does not then agree to sell it; but he does then sell
something, - viz., the right or privilege to buy at the

16. Id. at 369-70, 112 A. at 544-45.
17. Under current law it is clear that a devisee has a right to refuse to take under the
will. MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. §§9-201 to 9-209 (Supp. 1978). Consequently, the distinction between a devise subject to a charge and an option to

purchase is less clear now then at the time of Ludwick. A distinction exists
nonetheless, in that if a devise subject to a charge exists and one fails to act, one
receives the property subject to the charge, whereas, if one has an option to
purchase, a failure to act results in a loss of any right to the property.
18. 351 Pa. 131, 40 A.2d 471 (1945).
19. 97 Utah 335, 93 P.2d 450 (1939).
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election, or option, of the other party. The second party gets
in praesenti,not lands, or an agreement that he shall have
lands, but he does get something of value; that is, the right
to call for and receive lands if he elects.
According to the great weight of authority, a court of
Equity will decree specific performance in favor of the holder
of an option who has duly elected to exercise his right to
purchase. The principle on which this seeming exception to
the general requirement of mutuality in contracts is based, is
that the vendor's agreement to convey at the option of the
purchaser is a continuing offer until accepted within the
time and on the terms limited in the option, and when
accepted it becomes a valid agreement, supported by mutual
promises. 20
With these distinctions in mind, we can look to the will involved
in Clark v. Miller and determine what passed under it. In addition,
we can speculate as to what would pass under various other types of
testamentary dispositions.
In Clark, the will read, in part:
Kent Manor Farm to be sold, or, if C. Edward Miller, the
present tenant, wants to buy it, he may do so for $15,000.21
It is clear that what is contained in the will is an option to
purchase. The right of election is clear, and it is also evident that the
title to the land did not vest in Miller unless and until he exercised
the option by paying the $15,000. Therefore, if a testamentary option
to purchase is exercised, the question becomes whether it is the land
or the option that passes by the will. It seems proper to say that the
option was all that passed under the will. As noted above, an option
creates no interest in the property. Neither does it create a contract
to sell. All that passes is a right to elect to purchase and, upon such
an election, an enforceable contract to sell at the stated price comes
into being. Thus, it seems that the land passes under the contract
created by exercise of the option, while the option is what passes by
will.

20. Id. at 340, 93 P.2d at 452 (citations omitted). This definition is well supported by
other case law. See, e.g., Whitworth College v. City of Brookhaven, 161 F. Supp.
775, 782 (S.D. Miss. 1958); Jonas v. Leland, 77 Cal. App. 2d 770, 776, 176 P.2d 764,
768 (1947); Equitable Trust Co. v. Delaware Trust Co., 30 Del. Ch. 118, 125, 54

A.2d 733, 736 (1947); Morgan v. Forbes, 236 Mass. 480, 483, 128 N.E. 792, 793
(1920); Wurdemann v. Hjelm, 257 Minn. 450, 460, 102 N.W.2d 811, 818 (1960); In
re Hall's Estate, 99 N.J.L. 1, 5, 125 A. 246, 248 (1923); Larson v. Wood, 75 N.D. 9,
25 N.W.2d 100, 107 (1946).
21. Daily Record, December 13, 1961 at 3, col. 1 (Kent. Co. Cir. Ct., Equity No. 4517,
filed Aug. 8, 1961).
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On the other hand, where there exists a devise subject to a
charge, as in In re Horn's Estate,22 the title vests by virtue of the
will, and therefore the land would be regarded as passing by will.
Although silent on the issue of inheritance tax, the Missouri case
of Hirlinger v. Hirlinger2 3 is in accord that where an option is

created, it, and not the land, is what passes under the will. The court
stated that the optionee received no interest in the property by will.
All he received was a testamentary option to purchase real estate,
and options are no more than continuing offers to sell, which may be
created in a will.24

Another analogous line of cases is that dealing with federal
income tax law and options to purchase stock created by wills. In the
case of Cadby v. Commissioner,25 where an optionee sold his interest
in a stock option left to him in a will, the court had to determine the
basis of the option so that the gain or loss on its sale could be
computed for income tax purposes. The court found that the option
was property of value which passed by will. Therefore, the option
acquired a basis by virtue of its transmission by inheritance. The
court concluded that since the sale of the option was for less than the
was acquired by inheritance, no
basis established when the option
26
gain was realized from its sale.

In Mack v. Commissioner,27 the court was faced with
determining the basis of stock that had been acquired by the exercise
of a testamentary option and then sold. The court, in concluding that
the basis was the amount paid for the stock, recognized that the
property was acquired by purchase and not by bequest, 28 thereby
recognizing that the option, and not the stock, passed by will.
Although in the Mack 29 case one of the results the Internal
Revenue Service was attempting to avoid was the fair market value
basis that formerly was accorded to bequeathed property, 30 these
cases do speak to the issue of what passes under the will. The cases
indicate that it is the option, not the property, that passes by will at
death. Therefore, it is the option that must be valued for the purposes
of inheritance taxes.

22. 351 Pa. 131, 40 A.2d 471 (1945).
23. 267 S.W.2d 46 (Mo. App. 1954).
24. Id. at 49.
25. 24 T.C. 899 (1955).
26. Id. at 900.
27. 148 F.2d 62 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 719 (1945). See also Annot., 78
A.L.R.2d 1079 (1961).
28. 148 F.2d at 62-63.
29. 148 F2d 62 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 719 (1945).
30. Prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1976, inherited property acquired a tax basis
equal to its fair market value on the date of federal estate tax valuation. I.R.C.
§ 1014(a). The Tax Reform Act of 1976 substituted the basis of the property in the
hands of the decedent - a "carry-over" basis - for the previously allowed fair-
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There are some cases, however, which appear to disagree with
this theory. One is Schroeder v.Zinc,3 1 a New Jersey case in which
the deceased had given his company, during his life, an option to be
exercised at his death to buy certain stock for a fixed price. In
response to a contention that this contract did not create a taxable
transfer, the court stated that the agreement was a contract to sell
the stock through the medium of his executor and, therefore, was to
take effect after death. Although there was an obligation to hold the
stock until death, the possession and enjoyment of the rights and
privileges of voting and dividends -

the subjects taxed - were not

transferred at the time of the agreement, but instead at Schroeder's
death. The net effect of this agreement was a transfer "intended to
and actually taking effect after the death of the owner" for a price
far below the stock's actual worth. The transfer, therefore, was a
succession after death without adequate consideration, in effect a
testamentary disposition, and as such an attempt to escape the
normal tax burden on this type of succession. The court concluded
that, to the extent the consideration was inadequate, the transfer
was "tantamount to a gift and taxable."
The appellant/recipients in this case also contended that the
agreement's binding price should be equally binding for tax
valuation since this price could not be affected subsequent to the
agreement by price fluctuations occurring in the value of noncontract stock. The court dismissed this by noting that the
applicable statute mandated that valuation for transfers of this type
32
be determined by the fair market value at the time of the transfer.
The Schroeder court found that the contract to sell made during
the decedent's life and intended to be exercised at death through
decedent's executor was a "bargain or sale . . . intended to take
effect in possession or enjoyment at or after . . . death." 33 As a

result, the property sold at death was directly taxable. It was not the
option which was valued, but the property itself.
The New Jersey statute is almost identical to article 81, section
151 of the Maryland Annotated Code. The Maryland statute reads,
in part:

market value basis. I.R.C. §§ 1016, 1023. This new law was tempered somewhat
by a transitional measure that allowed the basis of property held by the decedent
on December 31, 1976, to be increased to its fair market value on that date. I.R.C.
§ 1023(h)(2). The Revenue Act of 1978 defers the effective date of the "carry-over"
basis by allowing the estates of persons dying before December 31, 1979, to use
the "stepped-up" basis in effect before the Tax Reform Act of 1976. Revenue Act
of 1978 § 515, Pub. L. No. 95-600, 92 Stat. 2763, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS No. llB. Estates of persons dying after December 31, 1979,
will be subject to the transitional rule and the Tax Reform Act. I.R.C. §§ 1014,
1016, 1023.
31. 4 N.J. 1, 71 A.2d 321 (1950).
32. Id. at 11-12, 71 A.2d at 326.
33. Id.
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The taxes imposed by §§ 149 and 150 of this subtitle
[Inheritance Tax] apply to all tangible or intangible
property, real or personal, passing either by will or under the
intestate laws of this State, or by deed, gift, grant, bargain
or sale, made in contemplation of death, or intended to take
effect in possession or enjoyment at or after the death of the
decedent . . . .34
This provision apparently specifically covers contracts entered into
before death and intended to be executed after death, as Schroeder
suggests.
The question remains whether the language of the statute also
refers to options created by wills. The only case the author has
discovered touching on this question is In re Cory's Estate,35 a New
York decision in which two brothers made a contract, which each
affirmed in his respective will, that gave the survivor the option to
purchase certain stock owned by the decedent at his death. The court
said that the stock sold to the survivor by virtue of the option in the
will was subject to the transfer tax 36 since the consideration required
- the option price - was less than the assessed value. In the court's
words, "Subdivision 4, § 220, of the Transfer Tax Act imposes a tax
upon the transfer 'by deed, grant, bargain, sale or gift ... intended
'3 7
to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after . .. death'.
The court found the brothers' agreement fell within the intent of the
statute. Even though the court found mutuality of obligation in the
brothers' contract, the agreement was characterized as merely an
agreement having no effect upon enjoyment or possession until
death. It was pointed out that either brother could have alienated the
stock during his life and, until one brother died, the agreement
remained wholly executory. At death, the surviving brother acquired
a right to purchase at a fixed price.
The court found, as did the court in Schroeder,3 8 that the
contract was made during life to be executed at death. The option
was merely put in the will to confirm the contract. Thus, the court
was correct in applying the transfer tax statute.
Where the option is created purely by will, however, no "deed,
gift, grant, bargain, or sale" is made during the decedent's life. All
that has occurred during life is the making of a revocable will
containing an option, itself revocable. As a result, the property does
not pass by deed, gift, grant, bargain or sale, intended to take effect
at death. Instead, it passes by virtue of a contract created by the

34. MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 151 (Supp. 1978).
35. 177 A.D. 871, 164 N.Y.S. 956, aff'd, 117 N.E. 1065 (1917).

36. Section 220(r) of the Transfer Tax Act of New York is essentially identical to that
of MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 151 (Supp. 1978).
37. 164 N.Y.S. at 957.
38. See text accompanying note 31 supra.
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exercise of an option given by will. The option, not the property,
passes at death and, therefore, such an option is property under
article 81, section 151 of the Maryland Code and subject to
inheritance tax.
There is one more case deserving discussion because of an
assumption by the court that decided it. This case, In re the Will of
Mary Ashbrook,39 involved a decedent who died testate as a resident
of Delaware. Her will gave the son of a long-term tenant an option to
purchase her farm in Kent County, Maryland for a fixed price. The
optionee chose to exercise the option but the appraised value of the
farm had risen over $60,000 from the time of making of the will until
the death of the testatrix. The chancellor sitting in Kent County,
Delaware, had to determine which party "should bear the burden of
estate and inheritance taxes on the value of Mrs. Ashbrook's bequest
to Mr. Wiest (the optionee), the difference in value between the option
40
price and the appraised value of the farm."
It is obvious from the last phrase of the above quotation that the
chancellor of Kent County, Delaware, would disagree with the
chancellor of Kent County, Maryland. The Delaware chancellor
would find taxable the difference between the option price and the
appraised value. There is no discussion of the theory on which
taxation is based, but we can speculate.
There appear to be two theories upon which taxation could have
been based:
(1) That the land passed under the will by bargain or sale
intended to take effect at death; or
(2) That the option is property passing by will that could be
valued and taxed.
It seems unlikely that the first possibility is the one used because
if it were, the Delaware court would be upholding taxation of the
transfer of land not situated in Delaware, which would be
unconstitutional under the well established doctrine of Frick v.
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.4 1 The only valid theory, then, is
42
that the option is property passing at death by will.

39. 291 A.2d 301 (Del. Ch. 1972).
40. Id. at 302. See also Armstrong's Estate v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 146
F.2d 457 (7th Cir. 1944), which refused to limit the value of stock to be included in
an estate for federal estate tax purposes to the stated option price where the
lower court found the stock's actual value to be in excess of this price.
41. 268 U.S. 473 (1925) (finding that a state's attempt to tax the transfer of tangible
personal property having an actual situs in another state contravenes the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution).
See also 53 Md. Att'y Gen. Op. 516 (1968).
42. Options, being intangible personal property, are taxable at the domicle of the
testator upon his death. This is based upon the legal fiction mobilia sequuntur
personam. See Frick v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 268 U.S. 473, 477 (1925).
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Thus, we are faced with two methods of taxing the transaction
at issue: (1) consider the option as passing by will or death and value
it accordingly, or (2) consider the land as passing by bargain or sale
intended to take effect at death and so value it. The first method
clearly seems to be the correct method. Each, however, would do the
job if an appropriate standard of valuation is determined.
IV. VALUATION
Certainly there should be little difficulty valuing the transaction
to be taxed if the property is considered to have passed at death.
Because Maryland, like all other states, does not place an
inheritance tax on transfers for adequate consideration, the amount
to be taxed would be the
difference between the assessed value and
43
the consideration paid.
If, on the other hand, we accept the theory that what passes at
death is the option, valuation is slightly more complex. The
complexity arises because there are four situations that could give
rise to different valuations:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

The
The
The
The

optionee
optionee
optionee
optionee

elects to exercise the option;
sells the option (if allowed);
rejects the option; or
does nothing.

The last two of these situations will be treated the same because
"doing nothing" usually results in the property being disposed of as
if the person had elected not to exercise the option.
Where the beneficiary elects to exercise the option, the valuation
process should be the same as valuing property received part by
purchase and part by devise. This results in taxing the difference
between the option price and the assessed value of the property as
did the Delaware court in In re the Will of Mary Ashbrook.4 4 This
method would produce consistency between transferring property
directly and transferring options to purchase the property, thereby
preventing tax avoidance possibilities.
In the cases where the option is sold, the value should be the fair
market value of the option. This is the position taken by the court in
45
Cadby v. Commissioner.
In the last situation, where one fails to elect or affirmatively
rejects the option, it seems that the only fair valuation is zero. Even
though the option could have been exercised or sold, once the right to
do so is lost, the option has no real value and has not benefitted the

43. Register of Wills v. Blackway, 217 Md. 1, 141 A.2d 713 (1958).
44. See text accompanying note 39 supra.
45. 24 T.C. 899 (1955).
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recipient in any way. The court in In re Hall's Estate46 apparently
agreed when it observed that an option, which may or may not be
exercised, is not the same as ownership. Options do not vest any
ownership of property itself or any interest in the property. If the
option lapses unexercised, nothing is transferred back to the offeror.
All that has changed is that the possibility no longer exists that the
offeror will be deprived of ownership by the exercise of the option.
For this reason, in In re Hall's Estate, a surrender of an option was
47
held not taxable.
At this point, we have two systems of valuation, each producing
the desired taxation. The remaining question is which is best for
Maryland.
V. WHICH VALUATION
ADOPT?

SYSTEM

SHOULD

MARYLAND

It seems clear from the analysis of the law and the cases that
Maryland should consider the option as passing at death. The
"bargain or sale" provision of article 81, section 151 appears not to
cover options created purely by will. Moreover, if one considers the
property, as opposed to the option, as passing at death, several
inconsistencies are bound to arise. If there is an option to purchase
and the recipient sells it instead of exercising it, no title to property
ever vests in him. 48 Therefore, in order for the state to tax the
transfer, the Maryland courts would have to consider the option as
property passing at death while denying that it was property in all
other instances. Furthermore, in a situation involving out-of-state
land, such as occurred in In re the Will of Mary Ashbrook, 49 the court
would have to consider the option as property passing by will or be
barred from taxing the transfer, under the doctrine of Frick v.
°
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.5
VI.

CONCLUSION

Judge Rasin's conclusion may seem equitable in light of the
circumstances of the owner/tenant relationship, 51 but it clearly
departs from the proper legal conclusion. Inheritance tax must be

46. 99 N.J.L. 1, 125 A. 246 (1925).
47. Id. at 5, 125 A. at 248.

48. It is possible that a court could find that, since the option holder has exercised
sufficient control over the option to sell it, he has exercised sufficient control over
the land to charge him with receiving it by devise. This would eliminate the
inconsistency noted in the text. It would not, however, change the valuation, as
the court would still limit the value to the amount received from the sale,
assuming there was a fair sale, since this would be the limit of the benefit.
49. 291 A.2d 301 (Del. Ch. 1972)
50. 268 U.S. 473 (1925).
51. See note 9 supra.
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paid on such testamentary dispositions unless it can be shown that
the purchase price (whether money, money and labor, or merely
labor) equals the appraised value of the property. In fact, Judge
Rasin seemed to recognize the dangers inherent in his decision when
he stated,
There is no prohibition against the decedent
establishing a price and it may well be that the Legislature
should provide for the situation where there is a wide
discrepancy between the price established in the Will and
the appraised value at the time5 2of death as determined by
the Orphans' Court appraisers.
Probably legislative action is necessary, even if Judge Rasin's
conclusion is not accepted, because it would clearly establish the
legislature's intent. Until such time, however, the Maryland courts
should take the position that a testamentary option to purchase is
property to be valued and taxed under the present inheritance tax
laws.
52. Clark v. Miller, Daily Record, December 13, 1961 at 3, col. 2 (Kent Co. Cir. Ct.,
Equity No. 4517, filed Aug. 8, 1961).

